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Abstract
Feature attributions are a popular tool for explaining the behavior of Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs), but have recently been shown to be vulnerable to attacks that
produce divergent explanations for nearby inputs. This lack of robustness is es-
pecially problematic in high-stakes applications where adversarially-manipulated
explanations could impair safety and trustworthiness. Building on a geometric
understanding of these attacks presented in recent work, we identify Lipschitz
continuity conditions on models’ gradient that lead to robust gradient-based at-
tributions, and observe that smoothness may also be related to the ability of an
attack to transfer across multiple attribution methods. To mitigate these attacks
in practice, we propose an inexpensive regularization method that promotes these
conditions in DNNs, as well as a stochastic smoothing technique that does not
require re-training. Our experiments on a range of image models demonstrate that
both of these mitigations consistently improve attribution robustness, and confirm
the role that smooth geometry plays in these attacks on real, large-scale models.
1 Introduction
Attribution methods map each input feature of a model to a numeric score that quantifies its relative
importance towards the model’s output. At inference time, an analyst can view the attribution map
alongside its corresponding input to interpret the data attributes that are most relevant to a given
prediction. In recent years, this has become a popular way of explaining the behavior of Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs), particularly in domains such as medicine [6] and other safety-critical
tasks [23] where the opacity of DNNs might otherwise prevent their adoption. Recent work has
shown that attribution methods may be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [13, 15, 17, 19, 46].
Namely, it is often possible to find a norm-bounded set of changes to feature values that do not
affect the model’s output behavior, but yield attribution maps with adversarially-chosen qualities.
For example, an attacker might introduce visually-imperceptible changes that cause the mapping
generated for a medical image classifier to focus attention on an irrelevant region. This could lead
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to confusion or uncertainty on the part of a domain expert who uses the model, and more generally,
has troubling implications for the continued adoption of attribution methods for explainability in
high-stakes settings.
Contributions. In this paper, we characterize the vulnerability of attribution methods in terms of the
geometry of the targeted model’s decision surface. Restricting our attention to attribution methods that
primarily use information from the model’s gradients [37, 40, 44], we formalize attribution robustness
as a local Lipschitz condition on the mapping, and show that certain smoothness criteria of the model
ensure robust attributions (Sec. 3, Theorems 1 and 2). Importantly, our analysis suggests that attacks
are less likely to transfer across attribution methods when the model’s decision surface is smooth
(Sec. 3.2), and our experimental results confirm this (Sec. 5.3). While this phenomenon is widely-
known for adversarial examples [45], to our knowledge this is the first systematic demonstration of it
for attribution attacks.
As typical DNNs are unlikely to typically satisfy the criteria, we propose Smooth Surface Regulariza-
tion (SSR) to impart models with robust gradient-based attributions (Sec. 4, Def. 7). Unlike prior
regularization techniques that aim to mitigate attribution attacks [10], our approach does not require
solving an expensive second-order inner objective during training, and our experiments show that it
effectively promotes robust attribution without significant reductions in model accuracy (Sec. 5.2).
Finally, we propose a stochastic post-processing method as an alternative to SSR (Sec. 4), and validate
its effectiveness experimentally on models of varying size and complexity, including pre-trained
ImageNet models (Sec. 5.1).
Taken together, our results demonstrate the primal role that model geometry plays in attribution
attacks, but that a variety of smoothing techniques can effectively mitigate the problem on large-scale,
state-of-the-art models.
2 Background
We begin with notation and an introduction to the attribution methods we consider in the rest of the
paper and the attacks that target them. Let arg maxc fc(x) = y be a DNN that outputs a predicted
class y for an input x ∈ Rd. Unless stated otherwise, f is a feed-forward network with ReLU
activations.
Attribution methods. An attribution z = g(x, f), indicates the importance of features x towards a
quantity of interest [22] f , which for our work will be the pre or post-softmax score of the predicted
class y. When f is clear from the context, we write just g(x). We also denote Oxf(x) as the gradient
of f w.r.t the input. Throughout the paper we focus on the following gradient-based attribution
methods.
Definition 1 (Saliency Map (SM) [37]). Given a model f(x), the Saliency Map for an input x is
defined as g(x) = Oxf(x).
Definition 2 (Integrated Gradients (IG) [44]). Given a model f(x), a user-defined baseline input
xb, the Integrated Gradient is the path integral defined as g(x) = (x− xb) ◦
∫ 1
0
Orf(r(t))dt where
r(t) = xb + (x− xb)t and ◦ is Hadamard product.
Definition 3 (Smooth Gradient (SG) [40]). Given f(x) and a user-defined variance σ, Smooth
Gradient is defined as g(x) = Ez∼N (x,σ2I)Ozf(z).
The methods mentioned above are chosen in the paper since they are widely available, e.g. captum [20]
API for Pytorch, and suitable for a broad architectures of neural networks due to the invariance of
implementation, a property which DeepLIFT [35] and LRP [7] do not satisfy. We exclude Guided
Backpropogation [43] due to its failure under Sanity Check [1]. Besides gradient-based methods, we
also exclude the discussion about variations of CAMs [29, 34, 48, 53] as they are designed only for
CNNs, and perturbation methods [32, 33, 39, 51] as they have not been the focus of prior attacks.
Attacks. Similar to adversarial examples [16], recent work demonstrates that gradient-based
attribution maps are also vulnerable to small distortions [19]. We refer to an attack that tries to modify
the original attribution map with properties chosen by the attacker as attribution attack.
Definition 4 (Attribution attack). An attacker tries to optimize the following objective to find a
perturbation  to an input x within a maximum allowed distance δp in the `p ball around x to produce
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dissimilar attribution maps without changing the model’s prediction.
min
||||p≤δ
Lg(x,x + ) s.t. arg max
c
fc(x) = arg max
c
fc(x + ) (1)
where Lg is an attacker-defined loss measuring the similarity between g(x) and g(x + ).
To perform an attribution attack for ReLU networks, a common technique is to replace ReLU
activations with an approximation such as Softplus S(x) def= β−1[1 + exp(βx)] to ensure that the
second-order derivative is non-zero. Ghorbani et al. [15] propose top-k, mass-center and targeted
attacks with different Lg . As an improvement to the targeted attack, the manipulate attack [13] adds
a constraint to the adversarial loss Lg to ensure similarity of the model’s output behaviors between
the original and perturbed inputs beyond prediction.
3 Characterization of Robustness
In this section, we first describe Lipschitz continuity as the major geometrical property we use to
characterize the robustenss of attribution methods. We show why and when Smooth Gradient is
robust compared to Saliency Map in Sec. 3.1. We end this section by discussing the possibility to
transfer the attribution attack based on the geometrical understanding of the robustness in Sec. 3.2.
The attack described in Def. 4 can all be addressed by ensuring the attribution map remains stable
around the input, motivated by which the lipschitz continuity can be a good measurement for the
attribution robustness [2, 3].
Definition 5 (Lipschitz Continuity). A general function h : Rd1 → Rd2 is (L, δp)-locally lipchitz
continuous if ∀x′ ∈ B(x, δp), ||h(x)− h(x′)||p ≤ L||x− x′||p. h is L-globally lipschitz continuous
if ∀x′ ∈ Rd1 , ||h(x)− h(x′)||p ≤ L||x− x′||p
Definition 6 (Attribution Robustness). An attribution function g(x) is (λ, δ2)-locally robust if g(x) is
(λ, δ2)-locally lipchitz continous and g(x) is λ-globally robust if g(x) is λ-globally lipchitz continous.
A
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Figure 1: Attributions normalized to unit
length in two-dimensions. Score surface
is represented by contours. Green and
purple areas are two predictions.
We choose p = 2 for Def. 5 and 6 in the rest of the pa-
per unless otherwise noted. Viewing the geometry of a
model’s boundaries in its input space provides insight into
why various attribution methods may not be robust. We
begin by analyzing the robustness of Saliency Maps in this
way. Recalling Def. 1, the Saliency Map represents the
steepest direction of output increase. However, neural net-
works are very non-linear and the decision surface is often
concave in the input space. Locally, only neighbors within
an infinitesimal distance from the input may always share
similar directions of gradients, resulting in weak robust-
ness that is insufficient in most practical scenarios [19, 19].
Theorem 1 bounds the robustness of the Saliency Map
in terms of the Lipschitz continuity of the model and we
further provide an intuition with a low-dimensional illus-
tration in Example 1. Proofs of theorems and propositions
in this paper are all included in the Supplementary Mate-
rial A.
Theorem 1. Given a model f(x) is (L, δ2)-locally Lipchitz continuous in a ball B(x, δ2), the
Saliency Map is (λ, δ2)-locally robustness where the upper-bound of λ is O(L).
Example 1. Fig. 1 depicts an example low-dimensional ReLU network. We represent a binary
classification task with the green and purple areas and compute the Saliency Map (black), Integrated
Gradient (red) and Smooth Gradient (blue) for inputs in different neighborhoods A,B and C. All
attribution maps are normalized to unit length so that the difference in the direction is proportional to
the corresponding `2 distance [11]. We represent the surface of the output with the contour map. For
points in the same neighborhood, the local geometry decides whether similar inputs receive similar
attributions; therefore, attribution maps in region A is more robust than those in region B and C
which happen to sit on two sides of the ridge.
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3.1 Robustness of Stochastic Smoothing
Local geometry determines the degree of robustness of the Saliency Map for an input. To improve
the robustness of gradients, an intuitive solution is to smooth the geometry. Dombrowiski et al. [13]
firstly prove that Softplus network has more robust Saliency Map than ReLU networks. Given a
one-hidden-layer ReLU network fr and its counterpart fs obtained by replacing ReLU with Softplus,
they further observe that with a reasonable choice of β for the Softplus activation, the Saliency Map
on fs is a good approximation to the Smooth Gradient on fr. By approximating Smooth Gradient
with Softplys, they managed to explain why Smooth Gradient may be more robust for a simple model.
In this section, we generalize this result, and show that SmoothGrad can be calibrated to satisfy Def.
6 for arbitrary networks. We begin by introducing Prop 1, which establishes that applying Smooth
Gradient to f(x) is equivalent to computing the Saliency Map of a different model, obtained by
convolving f with isotropic Gaussian noise.
Proposition 1. Given a model f(x) and a user-defined noise level σ, the following equation holds
for Smooth Gradient: g(x) = Ez∼N (x,σ2I)Ozf(z) = Ox[(f ∗ q)(x)] where q(x) ∼ N (0, σ2I) and
∗ denotes the convolution operation [8].
The convolution term reduces to Gaussian Blur, a widely-used technique in image denoising, if the
input has only 2 dimensions. Convolution with Gaussian noise smooths the local geometry, and
produces a more continuous gradient. This property is formalized in Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Given a model f(x) where supx∈Rd |f(x)| = F <∞, Smooth Gradient with standard
deviation σ is λ-globally robust where λ ≤ 2F/σ2.
Theorem 2 shows that the global robustness of Smooth Gradient is O(1/σ2) where a higher noise
level leads to a more robust Smooth Gradient. On the other hand, lower supremum of the absolute
value of output scores will also deliever a more robust Smooth Gradient. To explore the local
robustness of Smooth Gradient, we associate Theorem 1 to locate the condition when SmoothGrad is
more robust than Saliency Map.
Proposition 2. Let f be a model where supx∈Rd |f(x)| = F < ∞ and f is also (L, δ2)-locally
lipchitz continuous in the ball B(x, δ2). With a proper chosen standard deviation σ >
√
δ2F/L, the
upper-bound of the local robustness of Smooth Gradient is always smaller than the upper-bound of
the local robustness of Saliency Map.
Remark. Upper-bounds of the robustness coefficients describe the worst-case dissimilarity between
attributions for nearby points. The least reasonable noise level is proportional to
√
1/L. When we fix
the size of the ball, δ2, Saliency Map in areas where the model has lower Lipschitz continuity constant
is already very robust according to Theorem 1. Therefore, to significantly outperform the robustness
of Saliency Map in a scenario like this, we need a higher noise level σ. For a fixed Lipschitz constant
L, achieving local robustness across a larger local neighborhood requires proportionally larger σ.
3.2 Transferability of Local Perturbations
Viewing Prop. 2 from an adversarial view, it is possible that an adversary happens to find a certain
neighbor whose local geometry is totally different from the input so that the chosen noise level is
not large enough to produce semantically similar attribution maps. Similar idea can also be applied
to Integrated Gradient. Region B in the Example 1 shows that how tiny local change can affect the
gradient information between the baseline and the input: when two nearby points are located on each
side of the ridge, the linear path from the baseline (left bottom corner) towards the input can be very
different. The possibility of a transferable adversarial noise is critical since attacking Saliency Map
requires much less computation budget than attacking Smooth Gradient and Integrated Gradient. We
demonstrate the transfer attack of attribution maps and discuss the resistance of different methods
against transferred adversarial noise in the Experiment III of Sec. 5.
4 Towards Robust Attribution
In this section, we propose a remedy to improve the robustness of gradient-based attributions by
using Smooth Surface Regularization during the training. Alternatively, without retraining the
model, we discuss Uniform Gradient, another stochastic smoothing for the local geometry, towards
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robust interpretation. Gradient-based attributions relates deeply to Saliency Map by definitions.
Instead of directly improving the robustness of Smooth Gradient or Integrated Gradient, which are
computationally intensive, we should simply consider how to improve the robustness of Saliency
Map, the continuity of input gradient. Theorem 3 builds the connection between the continuity of
gradients for a general function with the input Hessian.
Theorem 3. Given a twice-differentiable function f : Rd1 → Rd2 , with the first-order Taylor
approximation, maxx′∈B(x,δ2) ||Oxf(x)−Ox′f(x′)||2 ≤ δ2 maxi |ξi| where ξi is the i-th eigenvalue
of the input Hessian Hx.
Smooth Surface Regularization. Direct computation of the input Hessian can be expensive and in
the case of ReLU networks, not possible to optimize as the second-order derivative is zero. Singla
et al [39] introduce a closed-form solution of the input Hessian for ReLU networks and find its
eigenvalues without doing exact engein-decomposition on the Hessian matrix. Motivated by Theorem
3 we propose Smooth Surface Regularization (SSR) to minimize the difference between Saliency
Maps for nearby points.
Proposition 3 (Singla et al’ s Closed-form Formula for Input Hessian [39]). Given a ReLU network
f(x), the input Hessian of the loss can be approximated by H˜x = W (diag(p)− p>p)W>, where
W is the Jacobian matrix of the logits vector w.r.t to the input and p is the probits of the model.
diag(p) is an identity matrix with its diagonal replaced with p. H˜x is positive semi-definite.
Definition 7 (Smooth Surface Regularization (SSR)). Given data pairs (x, y) drawn from a distribu-
tion D, the training objective of SSR is given by
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D[L((x, y);θ) + βsmax
i
ξi] (2)
where θ is the parameter vector of the the model f , maxi ξi is the largest eigenvalue of the Hessian
matrix H˜x of the regular training loss L (e.g. Cross Entropy) w.r.t to the input. β is a hyper-parameter
for the penalty level and s ensures the scale of the regularization term is comparable to regular loss.
Connection with Adversarial Training. We provide a theoretical analysis for the connection
between adversarial training and robust attribution regularization. Simon-Gabrie et al. [36] points out
that training with ||OxL||p penalty is a first-order Taylor approximation to include the adversarial
data within the `q ball where 1/p+ 1/q = 1, which has been empirically discoved by [28] as well.
Let x† = arg maxx′∈B(x,δp) ||Ox′L||p. On the other hand, given a model with (λ, δ2)-local robust
Salienc Map, λ is proportional to maxx′∈B(x,δ2) ||OxL − Ox′L||2. Assume the maximization is
achievable at x∗, we have λ ∝ ||OxL − Ox∗L||2. Triangle inequality offers ||OxL − Ox∗L||2 ≤
||OxL||2 + ||Ox∗L||2 ≤ 2||Ox†L||2, the same upper-bound for the adversarial training with p = 2.
Ideally, min-max optimization of ||OxL||2 in B(x, δ2) will lead to a robust model in both prediction
and attribution. Practically, Xu et al. [50] implement this regularization by replacing ReLU with
Softplus; however, for ReLU network, no approximation for the min-max of ||OxL||p has been
discussed to the best of our knowledge. We also include more discussion in the Supplementary
Material B.
An Alternative Stochastic Smoothing. Users demanding robust interpretations are not always
willing to afford extra budget for re-training. Except convolution with Guassian function, there is an
alternative surface smoothing technique widely used in the mesh smoothing, laplacian smoothing [18,
41]. The key idea behind laplacian smoothing is that it replace the value of a point of interest on a
surface using the aggregation of all neighbors within a specific distance. Adapting the motivation of
laplacian smoothing, we examine the smoothing performance of UniGrad in this paper as well.
Definition 8 (Uniform Gradient (UG) ). Given an input point x, the UniGrad UGc(x) is defined as:
g(x) = OxEpf(z) = EpOxf(z) where p(z) = U(x, r) is a uniform distribution centered at x with
radius r.
The second equality holds since the integral boundaries are not a function of the input due to the
Leibniz integral rule. We include the visual comparisons of Uniform Gradient with other attribution
methods in the Appendix D1. We also show the change of visualization against the noise radius r in
the Supplymentary Material D2.
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Figure 2: (a): Illustration of log-based AUC evaluation metric of Sec. 5. We evaluate each attack with
∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 and compute the area under the curve for each metric, e.g. top-k intersection. (b): An
example of visual comparisons on the attribution attack on Saliency Map with nature training (NAT)
and with Smooth Surface Regularization (SSR, β = 0.3) training. We then apply the manipulate
attack with maximum allowed perturbation  = 8 in the `∞ space for 50 steps to the same image,
respectively. The perturbed input for NAT model is omitted since they are visually similar.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Attribution Attack on CIFAR-10 [21] and Flower [27]
with ResNet-20 model and on ImageNet [12] with pre-trained ResNet-50 model. We apply the
top-k [15] and manipulate attack [13] to each method. To evaluate the similarity between the original
and perturbed attribution maps, except the metrics used by [15]: Top-k Intersection (k-in), Spearman’s
rank-order correlation (cor) and Mass Center Dislocation (cdl), we also include Cosine Distance
(cosd) as higher consine distance corresponds to higher `2 distance between attribution maps and the
value is bounded between [−1, 1], which provides comparable results across datasets compared to
the `2 distance. Further implementation details are included in the Supplementary Material C1.
5.1 Experiment I: Robustness via Stochastic Smoothing
In this experiment, we compare the robustness of different attribution methods on models with the
natural training algorithm.
Setup. We optimize the Eq (1) with maximum allowed perturbation ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 for 500 images
for CIFAR-10 and Flower and 1000 images for ImageNet. We first take the average scores over all
evaluated images and then aggregate the results over different log2 ∞ using the area under the metric
curve (AUC) (the log scale ensures each ∞ is equally treated and an illustration is shown in Fig. 2a).
Higher AUC scores of k-in and cor or lower AUC scores of cdl and cosd indicate higher similarity
between the original and the perturbed attribution maps. More information about hyper-parameters is
included in the Supplementary Material B2.
Numerical Analysis. With results shown in Table 1, we conclude that attributions with stochastic
smoothing, Smooth Gradient and Uniform Gradient, are showing better robustness than Saliency
Map and Integrated Gradient on most of metrics. Uniform Gradient is consistently better on the top-k
intersection metric compared to other metrics. Given some potential disagreement between metrics,
we reply on mass center dislocation more since it is more perceptional to human when locating the
importance features by the density of attribution scores. What is more, Smooth Gradient does better
on dataset with smaller sizes while Uniform does better on images with larger size.
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TopK Attack Manipulate Attack
SM IG SG UG SM IG SG UG
CIFAR-10
32× 32
k-in 0.51 0.84 0.75 2.94 0.49 0.81 0.85 2.95
cor 1.85 1.96 1.67 1.85 1.82 1.95 1.70 1.89
cdl 2.93 3.05 1.97 3.08 2.93 2.83 1.83 2.98
cosd 0.70 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.54
Flower
64× 64
k-in 0.97 1.39 1.72 2.00 1.08 1.51 1.48 2.03
cor 2.26 2.41 2.31 2.24 2.27 2.43 2.24 2.26
cdl 4.10 3.80 1.61 4.21 3.88 3.35 2.47 4.37
cor 0.53 0.40 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.36 0.36 0.47
ImageNet
224× 224
k-in 0.73 1.05 1.38 1.52 0.69 1.04 1.40 1.51
cor 1.73 1.90 2.08 2.15 1.73 1.97 2.11 2.14
cdl 22.45 14.17 9.74 5.81 21.66 12.60 9.14 5.60
cosd 0.93 0.76 0.49 0.41 0.96 0.75 0.50 0.41
Table 1: Evaluation of the top-k and manipulate attack on different dataset. We use k = 20, 80
and 1000 pixels, respectively for CIFAR-10, Flower, and ImageNet to ensure the ratio of k over
the total number of pixels (in the first column) is approximately consistent across the dataset. Each
number in the table is computed by firstly taking the average scores over all evaluated images and
then aggregating the results over different maximum allowed perturbation ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 with the
area under the metric curve. The bold font identifies the most robust method under each metric for
each dataset.
5.2 Experiment II: Robustness via Regularization
Secondly, we evaluate the improvement of robustness via SSR. For the baseline methods, we include
Madry’s training [26] and IG-NORM [10], an recent proposed regularization to improve the robustness
of Integrated Gradient.
Setup. SSR: we use the scaling coefficient s = 1e6 and the penalty β = 0.3. We discuss the choice
of hyper-parameter for SSR in the the Supplementary Material B3. Madry’s: we use cleverhans [30]
implementation with PGD perturbation δ2 = 0.25 in the `2 space and the number of PGD iterations
equals to 30. IG-NORM: We use the author’s release code with default penalty level γ = 0.1. We
maintain the same training accuracies and record the per-epoch time with batch size of 32 on one
NVIDIA Titan V. However, we discovery that IG-NORM is sensitive to the weight initialization and
the convergence rate is relatively slow than other in a significant way. We therefore present the best
result among all attempts. For each attribution attack, we evaluate 500 images from CIFAR-10.
Visualization. We demonstrate a visual comparison between the perturbed Saliency maps of models
with natural training and SSR training, respectively, in Fig 2b. After the same attack, regions with
high density of attribution scores remain similar for the model with SSR training.
Numerical Analysis. Experimental result is shown in Table 2. We summarize the findinds: 1)
compared with results on the same model with natrual training (first row in the Table 1), SSR and
all baseline methods provide better robustness nearly on all the metrics for all attribution methods;
2) Due to the gap between the accuracies, we only highlight the scores indicating better robustness
with bold font between SSR and Madry’s. SSR provides better robustness compared to Madry’s. 3)
Though IG-NORM provides the best performance, it has high costs of training time and accuracy.
We show more results in the Supplementary Material B4.
5.3 Experiment III: Transferability
Given the nature of attribution attack is to find an adversarial example whose local geometry is
significantly different from the input, there is a likelihood that an adversarial example of Saliency
Map can be a valid attack to Integrated Gradient, which does not impose any surface smoothing
technique to the local geometry. We verify this hypothesis by transferring the adversarial perturbation
found on Saliency Map to other attribution maps. In Fig 3a, we compare the Integrated Gradient for
the original and perturbed input, where the perturbation is targeted on Saliency Map with manipulate
attack in a ball of δ∞ = 4. The result shows that the attack is successfully transferred from Saliency
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TopK Attack Manipulate Attack
SM IG SG UG SM IG SG UG
SSR (Ours)
β = 0.3
time k-in 0.68 1.05 1.04 2.95 0.80 1.18 1.26 2.95
0.18h/e cor 2.21 2.37 2.15 2.26 2.24 2.40 2.21 2.29
acc. cdl 2.54 2.24 1.77 2.50 2.25 1.98 1.41 1.48
81.2% cosd 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.38
Ma˛dry’s [26]
δ2 = 0.25
time k-in 0.43 1.03 0.94 2.95 1.04 1.67 1.14 2.96
0.24h/e cor 2.01 2.30 2.01 2.04 2.15 2.48 2.04 2.28
acc. cdl 3.09 2.20 1.84 3.08 4.76 3.26 1.75 3.59
82.9% cosd 0.55 0.36 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.29 0.39 0.40
IG-NORM [10]
γ = 0.1
time k-in 1.55 1.99 1.70 2.96 2.56 2.74 2.15 2.98
0.44h/e cor 2.75 2.86 2.73 2.78 2.91 2.95 2.80 2.89
acc. cdl 1.25 0.91 1.18 1.22 1.51 1.18 0.96 1.48
49.5% cosd 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04
Table 2: Evaluation of the top-k and manipulate attack on CIFAR-10 with different training algorithm.
The natural training is included in Table 1. We use k = 20. Each number in the table is computed
by firstly taking the average scores over all evaluated images and then aggregating the results over
different maximum allowed perturbation ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 with the area under the metric curve shown
in Fig. 2a. The bold font highlights the better one between Ma˛dry’s training and SSR. Per-epoch
training time (time) and training accuracies (acc.) are listed on the second column.
Original Input Saliency Map IntegratedGrad SmoothGrad UniGrad
Perturbed Input Perturbed Saliency Map Affected IntegratedGrad Affected SmoothGrad Affected UniGrad
(a)
TopK
SM IG SG UG
k-in 0.73 1.01 1.42 1.54
cor 1.73 1.85 2.10 2.17
cdl 22.45 15.90 8.49 5.18
cosd 0.93 0.80 0.48 0.40
Manipulate
k-in 0.69 0.98 1.43 1.54
cor 1.73 1.87 2.12 2.17
cdl 21.66 15.51 8.21 5.13
cosd 0.96 0.81 0.47 0.41
(b)
Figure 3: Transferability of attribution attacks. (a) Example manipulation attack on Saliency Map has
similar effect on Integrated Gradient. (b) Effect on attribution maps under noise targeting Saliency
Map only, average over 200 images from ImageNet on ResNet 50 with standard training.
Map to Integrated Gradient. The experiment on 200 images shown in Fig 3b on ImageNet also shows
that perturbation targeted on Saliency Map modifies Integrated Gradient in a more significant way
than it does on Smooth Gradient or Uniform Gradient, which are motivated to smooth the local
geometry. Therefore, empirical evaluations show that models with smoothed geometry have lower
risk of being exposed to transfer attack.
6 Related Work
The discussion of robustness serves as one of the various criteria to evaluate attribution methods,
e.g. sensitivity-N [4], proportionality [49], localization [9] and sanity check [1]. Motivated by the
geometrical understanding, Dombrowski et al. [13] also accounts the vulnerability of attribution
methods for the geometry and they show how to use Softplus to build a model with robust attributions.
Besides the geometrical explanation, Etmann et al. [14] characterize the robustness of attribution
maps with the alignment to the input and show that alignment is proportional to the robustness of
model’s prediction. Towards robustness of attribution map, Singh et al. [38] proposes soft margin
loss to improve the alignment for attributions. Chen et al. [10] propose two regularizations so that
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nearby points have similar Integrated Gradient. On the other hand, an ad-hoc regularization can be
an extra budget for people with pretrained models. Except Smooth Gradient and Uniform Gradient
discussed in the paper, Levine et al. [24] propose Sparsified SmoothGrad as a certified robust version
of Smooth Gradient.
7 Conclusion
We demonstrated that lack of robustness for gradient-based attribution methods can be characterized
by Lipschitz continuity or smooth geometry, e.g. Smooth Gradient is more robust than Saliency Map
and Integrated Gradient, both theoretically and empirically. We proposed Smooth Surface Regulariza-
tion to improve the robustness of all gradient-based attribution methods. The method is more efficient
than existing output (Ma˛dry’s training) and attribution robustness (IG-Norm) approaches, and applies
to networks with ReLU. We exemplified smoothing with Uniform Gradient, a variant of Smooth
Gradient with better robustness for some similarity metrics than Smooth Gradient while neither form
of smoothing achieves best performance overall. This indicates future directions to investigate ideal
smoothing parameters. Our methods can be used both for training models robust in attribution (SSR)
and for robustly explaining existing pre-trained models (UG). These tools extend a practitioner’s
transparency and explainability toolkit invaluable in especially high-stakes applications.
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Supplementary Material
Supplymentary Material A
A1. Proof of Theorm 1
Theorm 1 Given a model f(x) is (L, δ2)-locally lipchitz continious in a ball B(x, δ2), then the
Saliency Map is (λ, δ2)-local robustenss where λ is O(L).
Proof. We first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lipschitz continuity and gradient norm [31]). If a general function h : Rd → R is
L-locally lipchitz continuous and continuously first-order differentiable in B(x, δp), then
L = max
x′∈B(x,δp)
||Ox′h(x′)||q (3)
where 1p +
1
q = 1, 1 ≤ p, q,≤ ∞.
We start to prove Theorem 1. By Def. 6, we write the robustness of Saliency Map as
λ = max
x′∈B
||Oxf(x)− Ox′f(x′)||2
||x− x′||2 (4)
Assume x∗ = arg maxx′∈B
||Oxf(x)−Ox′f(x′)||2
||x−x′||2 therefore
λ =
||Oxf(x)− Ox∗f(x∗))||2
||x− x∗||2 ≤
||Oxf(x)||2 + ||Ox∗f(x∗))||2
||x− x∗||2 ≤
2||Ox†f(x†)||2
||x− x∗||2 (5)
where x† = arg maxx′∈B(x,δ2) ||Ox′f(x′)||2. Since f(x) is (L, δ2)-locally lipchitz continious, with
Lemma 1 and by choosing p = 2, we have L = ||Ox†f(x†)||2.
Therefore, we end the proof with
λ ≤ 2L||x− x∗||2 (6)
which indicates λ is proportional to L.
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Given a model f(x) and we assume F = maxx∈B |f(x)| < ∞, and a user-
defined noise level σ, the following equation holds for SmoothGrad: g(x) = Ez∼N (x,σ2I)Ozf(z) =
Ox[(f ∗ q)(x)] where q(x) ∼ N (0, σ2I) and ∗ denotes the convolution.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 follows Bonnets’ Theorem and Stein’s Theorem which have been
discussed by Lin et al. [25]. We first show that
Lemma 2. l Given a locally Lipschitz continuous function f : Rd → R, and a Gaussian distribution
q(z) ∼ N (x, σ2I), we have
Eq[Ozh(z)] = Eq[(σ2I)−1(z− x)h(z)] (7)
The proof of Lemma 2 is described by the Lemma 5 of Lin et al. [25] and follow the proof of Theorem
3 of Lin et al. [25] we show that
OxEq[h(z)] =
∫
h(z)OxN (z|x, σ2I)dz (8)
=
∫
h(z)(σ2I)−1(z− x)N (z|x, σ2I)dz (9)
= Eq[(σ2I)−1(z− x)h(z)] (10)
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Therefore, we have Eq[Ozh(z)] = OxEq[h(z)]. Since
Eq[h(z)] =
∫
h(z)N (z|x, σ2I)dz (11)
=
∫
h(z)q(z− x)dz (12)
=
∫
h(z)q(x− z)dz (13)
By the definition of convolution, Eq[h(z)] = f ∗ q. Hence, we prove the proposition 1.
A3. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Given a model f(x) and we assume |f(x)| < F < ∞ in the input space, Smooth
Gradient with a user-defined noise level σ is λ-robustness globally where λ ≤ 2F/σ2
To prove Theorem 2, we first introduce the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. The input Hessian H˜x of f˜σ(x) is given by H˜x = 1σ4Ep[(z− x)(z− x)> − σ2I)f(z)]
Proof. The first-order derivative of f˜σ(x) has been offered by Lemma 2, with the help of which, we
find the second-order derivatives following the proof in [52].
We then generalize Lemma 1 to a multivariate output function.
Lemma 4. If a general function h : Rd → Rm is L-locally lipchitz continuous measured in `2 space
and continuously first-order differentiable in B(x, δp), then
L = max
x′∈B(x,δp)
||Ox′h(x′)||∗ (14)
where ||M||∗ = sup{||x||2=1,x∈Rd} ||Mx||2 is the spectral norm for arbitrary matrix M ∈ Rm×d.
The proof of Lemma 4 is omitted since it is the repeat of Virmaux et al’s [47] Theorem 1.
We now prove Theorem 2. The robustness coefficient λ˜ of SmoothGrad is equivalent to the robustness
of Saliency Map on f˜σ(x) based on Lemma 1. By Def. 6, the robustness of Saliency Map is just
the local lipschitz smoothness constant, in the other word, the local lipschitz continuity constant of
Oxf˜σ(x). Subsitute theh(x) in Lemma 4 with Oxf˜σ(x), we have
λ˜ = max
x′∈B(x,δp)
||H˜x′ ||∗ (15)
Let x† = arg maxx′∈B(x,δp) ||H˜x′ ||∗,
λ˜ = ||H˜x† ||∗ = ||
1
σ4
Ep[(z− x†)(z− x†)> − σ2I)f(z)]||∗ (Lemma 3) (16)
≤ 1
σ4
{||Ep[(z− x†)(z− x†)>f(z)]||∗ + σ2||Ep[f(z)I]||∗} (17)
≤ 1
σ4
{||Ep[(z− x†)(z− x†)>|f(z)|]||∗ + σ2||Ep[|f(z)|I]||∗} (18)
≤ 1
σ4
(Fσ2 + σ2F ) (19)
λ˜ ≤ 2F
σ2
(20)
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A4: Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Given a model f(x) is (L, δ2)-locally lipchitz continuous in the ball B(x, δp) and
assuming supx∈Rd |f(x)| = F < ∞. With a proper chosen noise level σ >
√
δ2F/L, the upper-
bound of the local robustness of Smooth Gradient is always smaller than the upper-bound of the local
robustness of Saliency Map.
Proof. Assume Smooth Gradient is (λ′, δ2)-local robust and λ˜-global robust. Denote B. Since the
global lipchitz constant is greater or equal to the local lipschitz constant [5] and by definition local
robustness is the local lipchitz constant for the attribution map, we have
λ′ ≤ λ˜ ≤ 2F
σ2
(21)
The second inequality is based on Theorem 2. We now start to prove the proposition. Given
σ > 0,
√
δ2F/L > 0, we have
σ2 >
F
L
δ2 (22)
We consider a maximizer x∗ ∈ B(x, δp) such that
x∗ = arg max
x′∈B(x,δ2)
|f(x)− f(x′)|
||x− x′||2 (23)
Since ||x− x′|| ≤ δ2 for any x′ ∈ B(x, δ2), we have ||x− x∗||2 ≤ δ2 We plug in this into Eq. (22)
σ2 >
||x− x∗||2
L
F (24)
F
σ2
≤ L||x− x∗||2 (25)
2F
σ2
≤ 2L||x− x∗||2 (26)
Based on Equation (6) in the proof of Theorem 1, given a model f(x) is (L, δ2)-locally lipchitz
continuous in the ball B(x, δp), Saliency Map is (λ, δ2) robustness and λ ≤ 2L||x−x∗||2 and Thereom
2, we prove the proporstion.
A5. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 Given a twice-differentiable function f : Rd1 → Rd2 , with the first-order Taylor
approximation, maxx′∈B(x,δ2) ||Oxf(x)−Ox′f(x′)||2 ≤ δ2 maxi |ξi| where ξi is the i-th eigenvalue
of the input Hessian Hx.
Proof.
max
x′∈B(x,δ2)
||Oxf(x)− Ox′f(x′)||2 ≈ max
x′∈B(x,δ2)
||Hx(x′ − x)||2 (Taylor Expansion) (27)
= max
x′∈B(x,δ2)
||Hx||x′ − x||2 x
′ − x
||x′ − x||2 ||2 (28)
≤ max
x′∈B(x,δ2)
||Hxδ2 x
′ − x
||x′ − x||2 ||2 (29)
= max
||||2=1
δ2||Hx||2 (Definition of Spectral Norm) (30)
= δ2 max
i
|ξi| (31)
(32)
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A6. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3(Singla et al’ s Closed-form Formula for Input Hessian) Given a ReLU network f(x),
the input Hessian of the loss can be approximated by H˜x = W (diag(p)− p>p)W>, where W is
the Jacobian matrix of the logits vector w.r.t to the input and p is the probits of the model. diag(p) is
an identity matrix with its diagonal replaced with p. H˜x is positive semi-definite.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3 follows the proof of proposition 1 and Theorem 2 of Singla et
al [39].
Extra Notation Let Wl be the weight matrix of l-th layer to the l + 1-th layer and bl be the bias of
the l-th layer. Denote the ReLU activation as σ(·). We use yˆ, p and y to represent the pre-softmax
output, the pose-softmax probability distribution and the one-hot ground-truth label.
Firstly, we describe the local-linearity of a ReLU network. The pre-softmax output yˆ of a ReLU
network can be written as
yˆ = σ(· · ·σ(W>2 σ(W>1 x + b1) + b2) · ··) (33)
= W>x + b (34)
where each column Wi = ∂yˆi∂x . Therefore, assume we use Cross-Entropy loss as the training loss,
we can write the first-order gradient of the loss w.r.t input as
OxL = ∂L
∂yˆ
∂yˆ
x
= W(p− y) (35)
Thirdly, we compute the input Hessian
Hx = O2xL = Ox(W(p− y)) = Ox(
∑
i
Wi(pi − yi)) (36)
=
∑
i
WiOx(pi − yi) (37)
=
∑
i
Wi(Oxpi)> (38)
=
∑
i
Wi(
∑
j
∂pj
∂yˆj
∂yˆj
∂xj
)> (39)
=
∑
i
Wi(
∑
j
∂pj
∂yˆj
Wj)
> (40)
=
∑
i
∑
j
Wi
∂pj
∂yˆj
>
W>j (41)
= WAW> (42)
where A = ∂pj∂yˆj
>
= diag(p)−pp> and diag(p) denotes a matrix with p as the diagonal entries and
0 otherwise. We use H˜x to denote WAW>, the input Hessian of the Cross-Entropy loss. Finally, we
show H˜x is semi-positive definite (PSD). The basic idea is to show A is PSD and using Cholesky
decompostion we show H˜x is PSD as well. To show A is PSD, we consider∑
j 6=i
|Aij | =
∑
j 6=i
| − pipj | = pi
∑
j 6=i
pj = pi(1− pi) > 0 (43)
The diagonal entries |Aij | = pi(1− pi). With Gershgorim Circle theorem, all eigenvalues of A is
positive, so A is PSD. Therefore, we can find Cholesky decomposition of A such that A = MM>.
Then H˜x = WMM>W> = WM(WM)>, which means the Cholesky decomposition of H˜x
exists, so H˜x is PSD as well.
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Supplementary Material B
B1. Eigenvalue Computation of H˜x
In this section, we discuss the computation of eigenvalues of the input Hessian in SSR defined in Def.
7. As pointed out by Supplymentary Material A6, we can write
H˜x = WM(WM)
> = BB> (44)
where B = WM. Let the SVD of B be UΣV, so that
BB> = UΣ2U> (45)
Note that B>B = VΣ2V> whose eigenvalues are identical to H˜x and the dimension of B>B is
c× c where c is the number of classes. Therefore, we can compute the eigenvalues of B>B instead
of running eigen-decomposition on H˜x directly.
B2. Adversarial training and robustness of attribution
In the Sec. 4 we discuss the connection between the robustness of prediction and the robustness of
attributions with maxx′∈B(x,δ2) ||OxL||2 with the first-order Talyer Expansion. In this section, we
also look into the second-order term. Firstly, we denote ∆L = max||||≤δ2 |L((x + , y)−L((x, y)|.
With the second-order Taylor expansion, we can write
L(x + , y) ≈ L+ OxL> + 1
2
>Hx (46)
Therefore, we have
∆L ≈ max
||||≤δ2
|OxL> + 1
2
>Hx| (47)
≤ max
||||≤δ2
|OxL>|+ max||||≤δ2 |
1
2
>Hx| (48)
Simon-Gabriel et al. [36] demonstrates that the first term max||||≤δ2 |OxL>| = δ2||OxL||2, we
now focus on the second term
max
||||≤δ2
|1
2
>Hx| = max||||≤δ2
||||22
2
| 
>
||||2Hx

||||2 | (49)
≤ δ
2
2
2
max
||||=1
|>Hx| (50)
With Rayleigh quotient, we have max||||=1 |>Hx| = maxi |ξi| where ξi is the i-th eigenvalue of
the Hessian. However, as mentioned by Simon-Gabriel et al. [36], the higher-order term has very
limited contribution to ∆L compared with the first-order term. Therefore, theoretically speaking,
adversarial training also regularize the largest eigenvalue as SSR does, however, SSR emphasizes the
importance of maxi |ξi| by the penalty term β and scaling factor s so that SSR can achieve better
robustness of attribution with less training budget.
Supplementary Material C
C1. Implementation Details for Experiments
Attribution Methods.We use the predicted class as the quantity of interest for all attribution methods.
For IG, SG, and UG, we use 50 samples to approximate the expectation. For IG, we use the zero
baseline input. For SG, we use the noise standard deviation σ = 0.1 × (ux − lx) where ux is the
maximum pixel value of the input and lx is the minimum pixel value of the input. For UG, we use
r = 4 as the noise radius.
Evaluation Metrics. Let z and z′ be the original and perturbed attribution maps, respectively,
attribution attacks are evaluated with following metrics:
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• Top-k Intersection (k-in) measures the intersection between features with top-k
attribution scores in the original and perturbed attribution map:
∑
i∈K n(z
′)i where
n(x) = |x|/∑dj |xj | and K is the set of k-largest dimensions of n(z) [15].
• Spearman’s rank-order correlation (cor) [42] compares the rank orders of z and z′ as
features with higher rank in the attribution map are often interpreted as more important.2
• Mass Center Dislocation (cdl) measures the spatial displacement of the "center" of
attribution scores by
∑d
i [zi − z′i]i [15].
• Cosine Distance (cosd) measures the change of directions bewteen attribution maps by
1− 〈z, z′〉/||z||2||z′||2.
Attribution Attacks. To implement the attribution attack, we adapt the release code3 by [15] and we
make the following changes:
1. We change the clipping function to projection to bound the norm of the total perturbation.
2. We use grad × input for Saliency Map, Smooth Gradient, and Uniform Gradient.
3. For the manipulate attack, we use the default parameters β0 = 1e11 and β1 = 1e6 in the
original paper.
For all experiments and all attribution attacks, we run the attack for 50 iterations.
IG-NORM Regularization. We use the following parameters to run IG-NORM regularization which
are default parameters in the release code4. We use Adam in the training.
epochs batch_size ∞ γ nbiter m approx_factor step_size
50 16 8/255 0.1 7 50 10 2/255
Table 3: Hyper-parameters used in IG-NORM training
where
• epochs: the number of epochs in the training.
• batch_size: size of each mini-batch in the gradient descent.
• ∞: maximum allowed perturbation of the the input to run the inner-maximization
• γ: penalty level of the IG loss.
• nbiter: the number of iterations used to approximate the inner-maximization of the IG-loss
• m: the number of samples used to approximate the path integral of IG.
• approx_factor: the actual samples used to approximate IG is m/approx_factor
• step_size: the size of each PGD iteration.
2we use the implementation on https://docs.scipy.org
3code is availabe on https://github.com/amiratag/InterpretationFragility
4https://github.com/jfc43/robust-attribution-regularization
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C2. Sensitivity of Hyper-parameters in SSR
choice of scaling s. We choose s = 1e6 from empirical tests for CIFAR-10 with data range in [0,
255]. A proper s can be found simply be setting s = 1 and β = 1 first to observe the scale of the
regularization. The data range and dimensions of the input determines the choice of the scaling
parameter s.
choice of β. We run a simple parameter seach for β = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. We train all the models on
CIFAR-10 with 25 epochs and record the training accuracy in Tabel 4 and we run the topk attack
on each model respectively on same 500 images where the results are shown in Fig. 4. Higher β
will require more training time to reach better performance and it may not necessarily produce better
robustness than a small β on some metrics, e.g. top-k intersection. Therefore, for the consideration of
training time and robustness performance, we choose β = 0.3 in the Experiment II of Sec. 5.
β 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
train acc. 0.81 0.78 0.70 0.62
Table 4: Training accuracies v.s. β in SSR on CIFAR-10 (s = 1e6).
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Figure 4: Attribution attack on ResNet-20 models with different hyper-parameter β and the identical
scaling term s = 1e6. The y-axis is the AUC score for each metric over ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 as described
in Fig 2a.
C3. Extra Experiment of Attribution Attack with Adversarial Training
Adversarial training on ImageNet usually takes a long time with limited resources. Therefore, we
only investigate how robust attribution maps are on a pre-trained ResNet-505 model and the results
are shown in Table 5. It shows that if a user has enough time and GPU resources, using adversarial
training can also produce considerably good robustness on gradient-based attributions.
5we use the released weight file from https://github.com/MadryLab/robustness
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TopK Manipulate
SM IG SG UG SM IG SG UG
k-in 2.22 2.55 2.30 2.23 2.21 2.45 2.30 2.21
cor 2.69 2.87 2.72 2.71 2.69 2.84 2.71 2.70
cdl 5.70 2.89 5.55 5.75 5.93 3.49 6.85 4.99
cosd 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.32 0.19 0.23 0.22
Table 5: Robust model (adversarially trained with ∞ = 8) evaluation of the top-k,manipulate and
mass center attack on ImageNet dataset. We use k = 1000 pixels. Each number in the table is
computed by firstly taking the average scores over all evaluated images and then aggregating the
results over different maximum allowed perturbation ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 with the area under the metric
curve. The bold font identifies the most robust method under each metric.
C4. Extra Experiments of Transfer Attack
Setup of Experiments. We describe the detailed setup for the Experiment III of Sec. 5. Experiments
are conducted on 200 images from ImageNet dataset. A pre-trained6 ResNet-50 model with standard
training is used. We first generate perturbed images by attacking Saliency Map, then we evaluate
the difference between all attribution maps on the original and perturbed images. The number of
iterations in the original saliency map attack is 50, number of steps for IG,SG and UG is 50. The
noise is normal distribution with 0 mean and 0.2 std in SG, uniform distribution with 0.2 radius
in UG. Top-K intersection (K=1000), correlation, mass center dislocation and cosine distance are
used to measure the difference. Each number in the table is computed by firstly taking the average
scores over all evaluated images and then aggregating the results over different maximum allowed
perturbation ∞ = 2, 4, 8, 16 with the area under the metric curve.
In the Experiment III of Sec. 5, we show the transferability of attribution attack. We here further
show the transfer attack with mass center attack of Saliency Map on all other attribution methods in
Table 6. Compared with Smooth Gradient and Uniform Gradient, Integtrated Gradient also has larger
dissimilarity on all metrics.
Mass center
SM IG SG UG
k-in 0.71 1.01 1.44 1.54
cor 1.73 1.87 2.12 2.17
cdl 24.41 17.34 8.99 5.09
cosd 1.01 0.79 0.47 0.41
Table 6: Transferability evaluation of mass center attack. We attack on the Saliency Map (SM) and
evaluate the difference between all attribution maps on the original and perturbed images.
Supplementary Material D
D1. Visual Comparison
In this section, besides the robustness, we compare the visualizaiton of Uniform Gradient with several
existing methods shown in Fig 5. The visualization shows that Uniform Gradient is also able to
visually denoise the original Saliency Map.
D2: UniGrad under different smoothing radius
Choosing the noise radius r is also a hyper-parameter tuning process. We provide visualization of
the same input with different noise radius from 2 to 64 under 0-255 scale with 50 times sampling
to approximate the expectation in Fig 6. When the noise radius is too low, it can not denoise the
Saliency Map while if the noise radius is too high, the attribution map becomes "too dark".
6we use the released weight file from https://github.com/MadryLab/robustness
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Figure 5: Visualization results of 7 baseline methods.
Figure 6: Visualization results of Uniform Gradient with different noise radius.
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